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Introduction 
Over the last two decades, social entrepreneurship (SE) has gainedconsiderable momentum world-wide. However, definitions of SErange from broad to narrow. The broad conceptualisation under-
scores innovative social value creating activities that occur within or across
the non-profit, business, or government sectors. Under the narrow defini-
tion, SE typically refers to the process and outcome of entrepreneurial and
innovative activities in the non-profit sector. In this article, the authors take
a narrow approach to defining SE in order to shed focused light on the in-
novative participation of civil society in post-disaster reconstruction after
the 5.12 Wenchuan Earthquake in China. 
Existing literature has interpreted socially entrepreneurial non-profits as
“stronger, more innovative, and entrepreneurial” alternatives to conven-
tional non-profits, (1) having the potential to solve social problems and cre-
ate social values in more sustainable, creative, and effective ways. As
Raymond Dart notes, “The changes from conventionally understood non-
profit to social enterprise are stark: from distinct non-profit to hybridised
non-profit-for-profit; from a pro-social mission bottom line to a double bot-
tom line of mission and money; from conventionally understood non-profit
services to the use of entrepreneurial and corporate planning and business
design tools and concepts; and from a dependence on top-line donations,
member fees, and government revenue to a frequently increased focus on
bottom-line earned revenue and return on investment.” (2)
However, SE is intrinsically a contextual process in which socioeconomic,
historical, and cultural contexts may have determining effects on its dynam-
ics and nature. (3) Empirical study of the phenomenon needs to analyse
specifically the embeddedness of SE through comparing the contextual ef-
fects of different countries, especially across the lines between developed
and developing countries or Western and Eastern regions. As the largest de-
veloping country in the world, China has experienced a bourgeoning devel-
opment of SE over the last few years, providing a theoretically promising
research locus to examine the contextual effects of SE. Socially entrepre-
neurial organisations emerging recently in China vary from one type to the
other in terms of development origin, social mission, organisational nature,
legal status, and operational model. (4) The burgeoning of SE in China is driven
by multiple forces embedded in the state, the market, and the third sector
of China as well as the international community. Various driving forces exert
their impacts in different ways, such as marketisation of state-owned welfare
institutions in the state sector; corporate social responsibility in the market
sector; commercialisation of non-profits and new co-operative movements
in the third sector; and diffusion of overseas experience (especially in the
fields of microfinance and fair trade) in the international community. (5)
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Social Entrepreneurship in China’s
Non-profit Sector
The Case of Innovative Participation of Civil Society in Post-disaster Reconstruction
XIAOMIN YU 
ABSTRACT: In recent years, civil society organisations in China have increasingly taken entrepreneurial and innovative approaches to
enhance their ability to fulfil social missions. How are we to delineate the salient characteristics of non-profits engaging in socially
entrepreneurial activities in comparison with their conventional counterparts? Will the emergence of social entrepreneurship in
China’s non-profit sector engender new opportunities for grassroots social organisations to overcome the financial and institutional
impediments constraining their development? This article tackles these issues through an in-depth case study of a typical social en-
trepreneurship initiative launched in the process of post-disaster construction after the 5.12 Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008. The fin-
dings indicate that socially entrepreneurial non-profits participate in post-disaster reconstruction more innovatively than conventional
non-profits in various ways. Nevertheless, they still need to conquer organisational and contextual challenges before evolving into an
effective remedy to the development pains of grassroots social organisations in China.
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The development of SE in China is still in its infancy, drawing scant aca-
demic attention. A handful of scholars have explored the issue by defining
its conceptual boundaries, identifying its driving forces, and delineating its
development landscapes. (6) However, few of them have provided empirical
analysis of the issue using either qualitative or quantitative techniques; and
none of them has examined the phenomenon through comparing SEs with
conventional counterparts in China’s non-profit sector. To what extent can
socially entrepreneurial non-profits be understood as a “stronger alterna-
tive” to conventional non-profits in China? In what ways will SE respond
effectively to development challenges faced by China’s non-profit sector,
such as scarcity of financial resources and the predomination of the Party-
state over civil society? This article seeks to provide preliminary answers to
these largely unexamined questions through analysing empirical data drawn
from a qualitative case study approach.
The year 2008 is referred to as China’s “Year of the Volunteer” or the “Year
of Civil Society,” (7) in recognition of the unprecedentedly vibrant civic re-
sponse to 5.12 Wenchuan Earthquake that wreaked devastation on Sichuan
and other parts of southwest China. In addition, the post-disaster recon-
struction not only witnessed a dramatic growth in the scale of civil society
(in terms of social donations, volunteering, and participation of grassroots
NGOs), but also fostered SE practices that have the potential to overcome
the barricades hampering the development of China’s civil society. For in-
stance, scarcity of financial resources is a grave challenge confronting many
Chinese social organisations, especially those operating at the grassroots
level. By launching socially entrepreneurial initiatives, grassroots civic or-
ganisations may find alternative funding sources through generating mar-
ket-based revenue, or establishing partnerships with commercial companies.
Therefore, the innovative participation of civil society in post-disaster re-
construction provides a suitable window to examine the research questions
we focus on. 
Data for this article derive primarily from an in-depth case study con-
ducted in 2011 of the “Joyful and Harmonious Home” (JHH), an SE initiative
operated in quake-affected areas by Global Village of Beijing (GVB). The
case was selected as a “critical case” (8) utilised to confirm, challenge, or ex-
tend an existing theory, based on several considerations: 1) as one of the
most prominent grassroots environmental NGOs in China, GVB has made
a considerable effort to integrate the notions and approaches of SE into its
strategies and practices; 2) the JHH program is recognised as the best prac-
tice of civic participation in post-disaster reconstruction because of its in-
novative quality and social impact; 3) the JHH program is one of a small
number of “sustained” SE initiatives located in the quake-stricken areas.
Empirical data were collected from anthropological fieldwork at a small vil-
lage in the mountainous rural region of Pengzhou City, Sichuan Province,
where the JHH program operates. Two kinds of research methods were em-
ployed: 1) semi-structured interviews with multiple stakeholders involved
in the JHH program (including two employees of GVB, one local government
official, two village cadres, and eight ordinary villagers); and 2) participant
observation of various reconstruction activities and business ventures under
operation. 
In the next section we briefly review the previous research on SE in the
non-profit sector. We go on to delineate the emergence of SE in the context
of post-disaster reconstruction after the Wenchuan Earthquake. This is fol-
lowed by findings from the in-depth case study, describing the origin and
profile of the JHH program, clarifying the activities for post-disaster recon-
struction, and discussing how the SE initiative differs from conventional
non-profits. We conclude with a discussion of the possibilities and chal-
lenges confronting Chinese civil society in employing the SE approach to
overcome existing development hurdles and advance further development.
Social entrepreneurship in the non-profit
sector: A literature review
The last two decades have witnessed a flourishing of SE as a “radical in-
novation” (9) in the non-profit sector across the world. Discussion of SE in
the non-profit sector is dominated by three different schools of thought –
the earned-income school, the social innovation school, and the social en-
terprise school. (10) Although the three schools of thought diverge in delin-
eating the boundaries and nature of SE and examining its dynamics, they
converge on a common analytical focus – the way SEs differ from traditional
non-profits as a new approach to solving social problems and creating social
value more sustainably, innovatively, and effectively. Synthesising contesting
explanations of this issue, socially entrepreneurial organisations (or social
enterprises, SEs) have been interpreted as “stronger, more innovative, and
entrepreneurial” alternatives to conventional non-profits (11) in terms of
strategy, structure, norms, and values. Specifically, the differences between
SE and traditional non-profits have been delineated in the following nine
aspects. 
Balancing social and economic objectives. Substantially distinct from
traditional non-profits driven solely by social goals, SEs need to strike an
appropriate balance between social and economic objectives. As “market-
driven and mission-led” dual-value organisations, SEs usually emphasise
“using business tools and approaches to achieve social objectives.” (12)
Hybridising organisational structure. Many SEs set up hybrid organisa-
tion structure in order to engage in both non-profit and for-profit activities.
The hybrid organisation forms found in SEs range from “holding companies”
that carry out for-profit activities and generate income for the non-profit
parent to “joint ventures” that take the form of partnerships between non-
profits and for-profits. (13) According to the level of integration between their
social programs and business activities, SEs fall into three categories: em-
bedded, integrated, and external. (14) In addition, organisational forms of SEs
vary in terms of legal status. After Italy introduced laws regulating social
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cooperatives in 1991, at least 14 European and North American countries,
as well as Japan and South Korea, had approved laws on SEs by 2009. (15)
Broadening operational models. Because they have both social and
commercial objectives, SEs contain a high level of complexity in their strate-
gies and operations. Not only do they have to generate sufficient revenue
to re-invest in their business ventures, they also have to maintain invest-
ment in social projects. (16) Sutia Kim Alter classifies a variety of operational
prototypes normally used by SEs, including nine fundamental models (en-
trepreneurial support, market intermediary, employment, fee-for service,
low-income clients as market, cooperative, market linkage, service subsidi-
sation, and organisational support) and combining models that provide the
best fundamental models to achieve the organisation’s dual objectives. (17)
Diversifying resource base. As with mainstream non-profits, socially en-
trepreneurial organisations rely on a resource pool combining financial,
physical, and human assets. (18) As the earned-income school highlights, in
contrast to traditional non-profits, which rely primarily on grants and do-
nations to achieve their social goals, SEs often engage in profit-making ac-
tivities and generate a significant amount of their revenues. (19) Going
beyond earned-income strategies, the social enterprise school stresses that
SEs often obey “three different types of economic principles – market, re-
distribution, and reciprocity,” (20) and create a diversified resource base that
often mixes earned income, donations, volunteering, and government sub-
sidies. (21) In contrast, the social innovation school focuses on elucidating
the innovativeness of social enterprise in using resources. 
Strengthening cross-sector partnership. In searching for resources they
need, SEs frequently rely on effective cross-sector networking and partner-
ship. (22) In the nexus of SE and company, SEs are increasingly partnering
with companies in new ways, such as cause-related marketing, endorse-
ment, sponsorships, and other forms of dealings with corporations, instead
of accepting donations. (23) In the nexus of SE and government, public au-
thorities usually provide direct support (such as public purchasing or grants)
and indirect subsidies (such as exemptions and tax deductions) to certain
types of SEs. (24)
Facing new challenges to achieve organisational sustainability. The
earned-income school argues that financial sustainability and self-suffi-
ciency are essential aspects of SEs that distinguish them from traditional
non-profits. (25) However, financial viability in itself does not provide a full
picture of the organisational sustainability of SEs. Instead, the long-term
durability of SEs depends on their ability to acknowledge and manage the
symbiosis between two competing sides of the organisation – commercial
activity (assessed by efficiency, competiveness, profitability, etc.) and social
action (evaluated by legitimacy, participation, impact, etc.). (26) In addition,
some empirical studies show that the long-term viability of SEs is deter-
mined by a variety of internal and external factors, especially “their ability
to gain resources and legitimacy, create cooperation with other institutions
and develop internal managerial and organisational capabilities.” (27)
Nurturing stakeholders’ participation and democracy in governance.
The main advantage of SEs over traditional non-profits is their governance
model. (28) In many countries (especially in Western Europe), SEs typically have
a democratic governance structure that allows the direct involvement of a
wide range of stakeholders (e.g. users, clients, donors, employees, volunteers,
social investors, etc.) or indirect participation through trustees or directors
who have the power to make decisions on behalf of stakeholders. (29)
Limiting profit distribution. Unlike conventional non-profits prohibited
from profit distribution, SEs are subjected to a “weakened” non-profit dis-
tribution constraint, to allow them to accumulate financial resources and
improve their economic stability. (30) However, the degree to which profit
distribution is constrained varies among SEs based on legal status and op-
erational model. 
Enlarging social impact. SEs are deemed to be more innovative than con-
ventional non-profits in that they seek new ways to accomplish social
change on a large scale. The SE paradigm provides non-profits with a mech-
anism to strengthen, expand, or enhance their missions by creating more
meaningful social impact, by reaching new client markets, or by diversifying
their social services. (31)
Based largely on SE practices in developed Western societies, previous lit-
erature has identified salient features that make SEs distinct from traditional
non-profits. However, as a handful of scholars assert, theoretical develop-
ment in this field needs to recognise the socio-economic, historical, and
cultural contexts in which SE practices are rooted. (32) The embeddedness of
SE indicates that previous theories on SEs that are constructed primarily in
the context of Western societies may have limitations if applied directly to
explain the situation in China, which differs from many Western societies
in terms of stage of development, welfare regime, state-society relationship,
and the nature of civil society. Therefore, empirical studies are needed to
achieve a deep understanding of the development dynamic of SEs in the
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Chinese-specific context. Although recent years have witnessed the growth
of empirical studies on SEs in China, (33) none of the existing literature fo-
cuses specifically on explaining whether, why, and how SEs in China differ
from traditional non-profits or deserve the label of “stronger alternatives.” 
Post-quake reconstruction and the emerging
of social entrepreneurship 
It has been more than eight years since the 5.12 Wenchuan Earthquake
hit Sichuan and other parts of southwest China. The devastating catastro-
phe left 87,000 people dead or missing, 374,000 injured, and millions
homeless, destroyed 50,000 villages and towns, affected the livelihoods of
an estimated 50 million people, and caused the direct economic loss of
845.1 billion yuan. Post-quake reconstruction became the most arduous
challenge facing the Chinese government and society at large. The prom-
ulgation of the State Council’s Regulations on Post-Wenchuan Earthquake
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction on 8 June 2008 marked the beginning
of the post-disaster rebuilding, which was designed by the Chinese central
authority as a process “integrating state leadership and civic participation.” 
The year 2008 was recognised as the “Year of the Volunteer” or the “Year
of Civil Society” in China because of an unprecedentedly vibrant civic re-
sponse to the disaster. Immediately after the disaster, ordinary citizens, so-
cial organisations, and socially responsible companies nationwide rushed
to the stricken areas to deliver all kinds of aid. The year 2008 saw 100 billion
yuan in social donations, with the earthquake accounting for 76 billion
yuan, up from 31 billion yuan in 2007. (34) Moreover, nearly five million vol-
unteers poured into quake-stricken areas to engage in rescue, relief, and re-
construction. (35) In addition, the quake triggered the growing participation
of grassroots NGOs. By the end of 2008, 263 NGOs or volunteer groups
had responded to the earthquake by raising funds, delivering materials, pro-
viding services, or organising networks. (36)
However, as the emergency phase moved into the more complicated and
demanding recovery and reconstruction phase, the involvement of civic
groups receded like an ebbing tide. It was reported that by April 2009, the
number of NGOs or volunteer groups working in the quake-stricken regions
declined from nearly 300 to fewer than 50, while the number of volunteers
decreased from nearly five million to some 50,000. (37) The fading away of
civic participation in the reconstruction process was a manifestation of the
structural obstacles encountered by Chinese civil society over the long term. 
First, scarcity of financial resources remains a grave challenge confronting
many Chinese civic organisations, especially those operating at the grass-
roots level. Currently, grassroots groups depend mainly on unstable dona-
tions from overseas funders. The earthquake seemed to bring about an
outpouring of domestic social donations. Nevertheless, China’s current char-
ity policies stipulate that only governmental organs and government-or-
ganised charities are allowed to receive donations for disaster relief from
the public. Amongst the 65.2 billion yuan in donations collected by the end
of 2008 for the earthquake, 58% went directly to government accounts;
31% (collected by local branches of government-run foundations) also in-
directly ended up in government coffers; and only 11% went to govern-
ment-run foundations, which became the only possible financial resource
accessible to civic organisations. However, in practice, these government-
organised foundations relied mainly on their local branches and govern-
mental ties to put the funds to work. (38) In short, although social donations
grew rapidly after the earthquake, only a tiny share of the new resources
was available to civil society and was unable to alleviate the scarcity of fi-
nancial resources among grassroots civic groups.
Second, with an authoritarian political-social regime, the Chinese Party-
state persistently holds the predominant position in its relations with civil
society and exerts tight control of civil society organisations through oner-
ous regulation of their registration and operation. To register as legal non-
profits in China, civil society groups need to meet certain physical
conditions (such as assets, staff, and an office) and find a qualified govern-
ment agency willing to be their “professional supervising unit.” However,
many grassroots organisations find it extremely difficult to meet all these
requirements. Limited by these registration hindrances, many NGOs choose
to register as for-profit businesses or to remain unregistered. Moreover, even
registered non-profits are prohibited from establishing branches and oper-
ating in areas outside of their registered location. (39) In the case of post-
disaster relief and reconstruction, the Chinese government took a supportive
position toward the involvement of civic organisations, especially those ca-
pable of providing professional services as a necessary supplement to gov-
ernmental agencies. However, all institutional barriers stemming from the
predomination of the Party-state over civil society still constrained the le-
gitimacy and sustainability of grassroots organisations (especially those not
officially registered) to participate in post-quake reconstruction. 
In sum, given the lack of funds and the unfavourable policy environment,
discovering an alternative way to sustain participation in post-quake re-
construction became an imperative task for many grassroots civic organi-
sations. In response, some innovative NGOs began to explore the possibility
of using the socially entrepreneurial approach to overcome financial and
institutional hurdles. According to existing studies, a wide spectrum of SEs
have emerged in quake-affected areas, ranging from non-profits engaged
in commercial activities, farmers’ cooperatives, and fair trade organisations,
to microfinance institutions. (40) However, there is no in-depth empirical
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analysis on the newly mushrooming SEs in disaster-hit areas. It is therefore
difficult to clearly delineate the characteristics of SE initiatives in compar-
ison with traditional non-profits and to comprehensively assess the advan-
tage of SE in overcoming major development hurdles faced by China’s
grassroots non-profits. The following section aims to fill this gap.
Empirical findings from the case study 
Organisation profile and program origin  
Da Ping, a small village of 279 households located in the mountainous
rural region of Pengzhou City, Sichuan Province, was devastated by the 5.12
earthquake. Over 80% of the houses collapsed, a large portion of its roads
and bridges were paralysed, and most villagers lost the resources to main-
tain their livelihoods. Fortunately, two months after the quake, this small
village witnessed the sprouting of an SE initiative, Joyful and Harmonious
Home (Lehe Jiayuan in Chinese, JHH), which was a multi-faceted recon-
struction program launched by Global Village of Beijing (GVB). 
GVB is an environmental NGO founded by Liao Xiaoyi in 1996 and reg-
istered in Beijing as a for-profit business. (41) Since Liao Xiaoyi won an inter-
national environmental award, the “Sophie Prize,” in 2000, GVB has been
increasingly recognised as one of the most remarkable grassroots NGOs
engaged in environmental education and sustainable development in China.
As the notions and practices of SE have been increasingly introduced to
China in recent years, GVB has gradually learned to make SE a tool for trans-
forming its disadvantage as a “business” NGO into an advantage in terms
of enhancing social legitimacy and financial resources. One of the most no-
ticeable entrepreneurial activities taken by GVB was a “fair trade service
platform” established in 2008 to facilitate fair trade between urban com-
munities, where consumers suffer increasingly from unsafe foods, and rural
communities, where farmers have no guarantee of livelihood due to unfair
trading rules in the over-commercialised agricultural sector. 
GVB’s SE aspirations achieved robust development through the launch of
the JHH program in Da Ping Village. For GVB, embarking on the JHH program
was much more than a spontaneous response to the disaster. Rather, it was
a deliberate effort to pursue sustainable rural development in China’s coun-
tryside, which has run into various developmental pitfalls such as environ-
mental pollution, community fragmentation, family dysfunction,
languishing rural economy, and the disappearance of traditional culture and
lifestyles in the country’s decades-long journey toward modernisation
through industrialisation, labour migration, and urbanisation. (42)
However, the JHH program was only a dream before GVB got start-up
funds of 1.8 million yuan from the Chinese Red Cross Foundation (CRCF) in
August 2008. Noticeably, GVB explicitly highlighted its SE nature when try-
ing to tap more investment opportunities for the program. As Liao Xiaoyi
explains, “One of the five salient features of the program is that it represents
a form an innovative philanthropy (…) as a social entrepreneurship entity,
on the one hand it is able to enhance investment efficiency through ensur-
ing a better operational performance in marketplace, but on the other hand,
its social mission to service the interests of villagers can be safeguarded
through a governance mechanism with participation of villagers. Thus this
program deserves more consideration and support from government, soci-
ety, and the investment community.” (43) Consequently, the JHH program
received funds from several foundations such as CRCF, Narada Foundation,
Jet Li One Foundation, and Give2Asia Foundation. By the end of February
2009, the JHH program had grown into a multi-purpose reconstruction pro-
gram backed by total funding of nearly 5 million yuan. (44)
Activities for post-disaster reconstruction (45)
To revitalise Da Ping Village in a manner that was environmentally, eco-
nomically, and socially sustainable, the JHH program launched a variety of
reconstruction activities, ranging from rebuilding residential houses and
public facilities, developing ecological industries, and providing social serv-
ices, to establishing a grassroots environmental protection mechanism. 
First, how to rebuild damaged houses in an ecologically friendly way be-
came a key concern of the program. State subsidies and social donations
constituted major funds for home rebuilding, which were managed as a
“collective fund” owned by all quake-affected residents in the village. Unlike
commercial construction projects, which are usually outsourced to con-
struction companies, the JHH program relied mainly upon voluntary work
by professional architects and volunteers, as well as the reciprocal labour
of villagers. Such an arrangement aimed not only at controlling costs and
ensuring quality, but also at embedding the concept of environmental pro-
tection and strengthening the values of participation, solidarity, and reci-
procity among villagers. By the end of 2009, 80 households had moved into
rebuilt eco-houses that were more seismic-resistant, land-saving, and low-
carbon than conventional houses. Due to the land-saving feature of eco-
houses, a large amount of redundant residential land belonging to farmers
prior to the quake was used to construct public facilities. By May 2010, a
diversity of public facilities, including two eco-clinics, two community cen-
tres, and a village college, had been constructed.
Second, the program endeavoured to revitalise the community’s economy
and provide a sustainable livelihood for all residents through developing the
ecological sector. Prior to the disaster, Da Ping was a low-income village
where annual income per capita was roughly 1,000 yuan, and the majority
of households relied on growing economic crops, planting medical herbs,
or taking casual jobs at nearby coal or limestone mines to earn a living. The
program was designed to revive the local economy by replacing unsustain-
able lime mining and chemical agriculture with green industries such as
ecological agriculture, countryside tourism, and innovative handicrafts. By
the end of 2009, four organic mini-farms, two organic livestock and poultry
farms, and one handicraft workshop had been built. These newly launched
green businesses were operated as an embryonic form of cooperative econ-
omy in which production was household-based while financial and trading
activities were managed intensively by professionals. The products made by
these cooperatives, such as the “Love Handkerchief” and “Green Chicken,”
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gained market access to nearby urban communities through the “fair trade
service platform” managed by GVB.
Third, the program strived to make preventive healthcare and other social
services accessible and affordable to all Da Ping villagers. To this end, the
program mobilised all available sources such as newly constructed eco-clin-
ics, specialised village doctors, and internet-based long-distance consulting
services. In December 2010, the village’s social services function was further
expanded with the establishment of the “Da Ping Sunshine Community Cen-
tre” resulting from the cooperation between GVB and Non-Profit Incubator,
the most influential incubator of grassroots non-profits. The community
centre is currently working on two main schemes: firstly, to foster commu-
nity groups such as “Kids Team,” created in July 2009 as an institution to
train village children as ambassadors of traditional ethics and the values of
environmental protection; and secondly, to carry out community-based
philanthropic and cultural activities. 
Fourth, the program intended to establish an effective environmental pro-
tection mechanism fully involving villagers. In order to embed the concept
of environmental protection in the everyday life of villagers, a series of fa-
cilities for energy saving and waste disposal, such as a methane system,
firewood-saving stoves, and garbage-sorting boxes and balers, were con-
structed in all households. Moreover, a refuse recycling system was estab-
lished through which some solid waste such as plastic and paper could be
processed appropriately for circular use. 
The making of a social entrepreneurship approach
To varying degrees, the JHH program operated by GVB reflects the nine
features of SE summarised previously, making it distinct from traditional
non-profits. 
Balancing social and economic objectives. The primary purpose of the
JHH program is to revitalise the quake-devastated Da Ping Village as a
model for “constructing ecological civilisation” in rural China that can be
replicated in many other villages. Unlike conventional community develop-
ment programs launched by NGOs, the JHH program has the economic ob-
jective of strengthening the financial viability and sustainability of the
program through engaging in various green industries such as eco-agricul-
ture, green breeding, eco-tourism, and innovative handicrafts. 
Hybridising the organisation structure. In contrast to many traditional
non-profits or cooperatives, all green business activities included in the JHH
program take the form of jointly-owned social ventures based on 15-year
cooperation contracts involving three partners: 1) GVB plays the crucial role
of absorbing investment and carrying out industrial planning, management,
and marketing. GVB therefore holds the controlling shares (51% of the
stake). 2) Da Ping Mountain Ecology Association (DPMEA), a grassroots en-
vironmental group established shortly after the disaster with GVB’s facili-
tation, represents the interests of 100 village households involved in the
JHH program by facilitating the management of various green industries
and coordinating the involvement of villagers. Thus, DPMEA and individual
villagers hold a 49% stake in the businesses. 3) The villagers’ committee
(the prevailing type of grassroots organisation in rural China, quasi-govern-
mental in nature) plays the role of maintaining the partnership between
the three parties and supervising the operation of the businesses. (46)
Broadening operational models. The JHH program strives to create an
operational model conducive to accomplishing social missions and achiev-
ing financial sustainability. Specifically, the JHH program operates as a “mar-
ket intermediary” (Alter, 2007) between beneficiary groups (cooperatives
and villagers) and marketplaces by providing value-added services such as
product development, production, and marketing assistance. On the side of
creating social value, the program helps villagers earn a liveable income and
enhance environmental standards; on the side of creating economic value,
market-based revenues help to cover program costs and strengthen self-
sufficiency.
Diversifying the resource base. The JHH program is a social experiment
in diverting mixed resources creatively from the state, social, and market
sectors. With regard to monetary resources, although its start-up funds are
mainly derived from social donations from foundations, local governments
also provide substantial grants – for example, the Pengzhou City govern-
ment offered one million yuan to construct the first motorway, which was
the precondition for developing the eco-economic sector in the remote
mountain village. (47) In addition, GVB attaches importance to self-earned
income through producing and trading organic vegetables, green livestock
and poultry, and innovative handicrafts. However, income from the sale of
green products currently constitutes only a small source of revenue, partly
because these new businesses remain small in scale or are operated mainly
as experiments for gaining know-how in green farming (such as fertilising,
controlling weeds, and saving water). (48)
Strengthening cross-sector partnership. GVB has made various efforts
to establish and strengthen partnership with local governments to gain le-
gitimacy and obtain resources crucial to the success of the program. In its
interaction with local governments, GVB focuses on networking with the
government at the municipal level rather than with the subordinate town-
ship level, believing that the former is more capable of providing substantial
resources. Such a strategy worked well until 2010, when the deputy chief
executive of the township government was elected head of the village
branch of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party chief), which is typically
the decision-making agency of the Party-state in the villages. Various dis-
agreements gradually arose between GVB and the newly elected Party chief,
who criticised GVB for not respecting the opinions of the township govern-
ment and two grassroots quasi-governmental organs, the villagers’ com-
mittee and the village branch of the Chinese Communist Party. The Party
chief subsequently set up a farmers’ cooperative planting bamboo shoots
and plans to launch other eco-industries through absorbing commercial in-
vestment. (49) This kind of conflictual relationship between GVB and the
township Party-state and its village branch apparently undermined villagers’
trust and loyalty toward GVB. Many villagers began to place their hopes in
alternative reconstruction plans that promised more significant benefits to
villagers than the JHH program. (50) On behalf of the villagers, the villagers’
committee finally proposed revising the cooperation contract between GVB
and Da Ping Village, claiming that the villagers should have more shares in
the joint-venture businesses and that the villagers’ committee should have
more decision-making power. (51) Improving the relationship with local gov-
ernments and regaining villagers’ trust then became a top priority in GVB’s
agenda. (52)
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Facing new challenges to organisational sustainability. The program
has not generated sufficient earned income to support its social programs.
Several organisational and contextual factors constrain its ability to accom-
plish financial self-sufficiency. First of all, as the major green industries of
the JHH program, ecological farming and livestock/poultry breeding are lo-
cated in unfavourable market conditions in which the demand for organic
food in local rural communities is quite limited, and grasping market op-
portunities in large cities makes the products lose their price advantage due
to increased storage and transportation costs. Nevertheless, GVB persists
in its market-based trading activities by exploring new approaches such as
processing fresh livestock and poultry products into instant products and
developing new market opportunities in local communities by more closely
integrating ecological farming and livestock/poultry breeding with coun-
tryside tourism. (53) Secondly, engaging in business activities poses various
managerial challenges to GVB, such as cultivating new efficiency-oriented
values, figuring out new ways to manage mixed human resources, and cre-
ating new approaches to assessing performance. Thirdly, the organisational
sustainability of an SE is not solely determined by its internal operations
but also by management of the environment in which it operates. In the
case of the JHH program, the fragile partnership with local governments
appears to be the major contextual factor jeopardising its legitimacy and
sustainability. In addition, the underdevelopment of the “social investment”
sector in China also makes it difficult to access sustained investment from
“social investors” that use a mainstream investment approach to provide
growth capital capacity-building services for SEs. 
Nurturing stakeholders’ participation and democracy in governance.
As designed by GVB, the JHH program operates through a “democratic” gov-
ernance structure to enhance the participation of villagers. To this end, GVB
in 2008 facilitated the creation of the Da Ping Mountain Ecology Associa-
tion (DPMEA) as a voluntary association of villagers involved in the program
in order to coordinate villagers’ participation. However, in the eyes of vil-
lagers, DPMEA is merely a “puppet” of GVB and is unable to truly represent
villagers’ opinions and interests, as the committee administrating DPMEA
was created through GVB’s appointment rather than through election by
villagers. It appears that in spite of the good intention to strengthen vil-
lagers’ participation in the program, a democratic governance structure was
not effectively established. Decision-making power was usually held by GVB,
and such a non-participative governance situation made villagers felt “mar-
ginalised” or even “employed as tools” in the process of reconstruction. (54)
Limiting profit-distribution. Although it engages in revenue-generating
activities, the JHH program does not aim at maximising profits but rather
at scaling-up its social impact. To this end, a limitation is set on the distri-
bution of profits generated from its business activities. Specifically, the prof-
its accrued under the shares held by GVB are prohibited from distribution
and are used only to accomplish its social missions. By contrast, the profits
accrued under the shares held by villagers are allowed to be distributed. Ac-
cording to villagers interviewed in 2011, each villager involved in the pro-
gram received 60 yuan at the end of 2010 as the distributed profits
generated from the green businesses. 
Enlarging social impact. To create greater impact, the program chooses
to pursue a “scaling up” approach by diffusing the experience of “construct-
ing ecological civilisation” in Da Ping Village to other rural regions. However,
both academics and practitioners doubt that the JHH model can be properly
duplicated by other social organisations in other rural communities. The
sceptics argue that few grassroots NGOs in China have GVB’s capacity for
fundraising, project operation, and social networking. In contrast to this
scepticism, GVB is quite optimistic about the replicability of the JHH model,
highlighting the SE model’s innovativeness in creating an ownership struc-
ture, governance mechanism, and operational model that can be transferred
to other organisations and locations. As a result of GVB’s persistent efforts,
in 2010, the JHH model gained the endorsement of government officials of
Wuxi County, located in the middle of the Three Gorges Reservoir Area in
Sichuan Province. By the end of 2010, the JHH model had been introduced
to three other villages in Wuxi County. 
Discussion: Will SE cure the development
pains of grassroots NGOs?
As revealed by the unsustained participation of civil society organisations
in post-disaster reconstruction, grassroots civic groups in China persistently
suffer from two major development pains: 1) the predominance of the
Party-state over civil society (or the dependency of civil society on the state
for legitimacy and resources); and 2) the insufficiency of financial resources.
As illustrated by the case study of the JHH program, some innovative grass-
roots NGOs in China have taken socially entrepreneurial approaches to
seeking more sustained participation in post-disaster reconstruction. As
other relevant studies show, various types of SEs are also playing active roles
in other fields of development in China, such as work integration, social
services (e.g. eldercare and childcare), health care, poverty alleviation, edu-
cation, rural development, and sustainable development. (55)
As the case study shows, grassroots civic organisation still encounter var-
ious challenges to overcoming the structural hurdles constraining their de-
velopment, even when using the innovative vehicle of SE. However, in recent
years, various efforts have been made by the Chinese government, SE incu-
bating organisations, and social investing institutions to strengthen the
“ecosystem of social entrepreneurship” – a healthy institutional and social
environment to support the practice of SE (56) in China. 
First of all, Chinese local governments have made institutional efforts to
foster the development of SE via legislative or policy platforms. For instance,
in September 2011, the Standing Committee of the Ningxia Hui Au-
tonomous Region People’s Congress promulgated Regulations on the Pro-
motion of Charity in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, promoting the
development of “social charitable enterprises,” recognised as the first local
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legislation on SE in China. According to the regulation, “social charitable en-
terprises” have one of the following features: 1) profits are not distributed
but are devoted to charitable activities; 2) continually engaging in charita-
ble, philanthropic, or social relief activities; 3) consistently donating a certain
percentage of the enterprise’s annual profits to society; 4) providing con-
centrated employment opportunities in which the disabled and the impov-
erished reach a certain percentage of the workforce; 5) offering
concentrated settlement of poverty-stricken people such as the elderly or
the disabled. Under the provisions of the regulation, “social charitable en-
terprises” can enjoy preferential policy treatment in accordance with the
investment scale of their charitable projects, ranging from low-interest loans
to the reduction or exemption of administrative fees and taxes charged by
local governments.
Meanwhile, although a specific policy concerning SE has not yet be prom-
ulgated, several policy changes at both the central and local levels are pro-
viding direct or indirect support to the development of SE in China. At the
central level, the Chinese government issued a new policy in 2013, Circular
of the General Office of the State Council on Government Procurement of
Services from Social Forces. The policy clarifies that the entities undertaking
government procurement include both non-profit organisations legally reg-
istered with civil affair departments or approved by the State Council as ex-
empt from registration, and social forces such as enterprises legally
registered with industry and commerce departments or institutions regis-
tered with industry administration departments. (57) The policy apparently
relaxes restrictions on government purchasing of social services, thereby of-
fering SEs registered in diversified legal forms more opportunities in the
growing market of government procurement of social services. 
At the local level, several provincial and municipal governments have
recognised the concept of social enterprises or have even begun to promote
the development of social enterprises in related policies. The Beijing mu-
nicipal government was the first local authority in China to use the concept
of “social enterprise” in policy documents. In June 2011, the Beijing Munic-
ipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued Opinions on
Strengthening and Innovating Social Administration and Promoting Overall
Social Construction, which recognises “actively promoting the development
of social enterprise and vigorously developing social services” as a strategy
to further enhance the level of public service. In November 2011, the Beijing
authorities issued a Social Construction Plan for the Twelfth Five Year Period
of Beijing City, highlighting the importance of “bolstering social enterprises.”
However, the definition of social enterprise is quite unclear, which poses a
vital obstacle to the government making more concrete policies subse-
quently. (58)
Secondly, in order to fully employ SE as a solution to alleviating the
scarcity of financial resources, grassroots NGOs need to develop their en-
trepreneurial spirit and business skills, which are crucial to enhancing finan-
cial viability and ensuring organisational sustainability. Very recently,
innovative initiatives have been launching SE incubating institutions to
meet this demand. For instance, in 2009, the Cultural and Education Section
of the British Embassy in China launched a Social Enterprise Programme
that provides aspiring and existing social entrepreneurs with skills training,
mentoring, and access to UK expertise. Up to the present, the programme
has trained around 3,200 social entrepreneurs, and has distributed 29 mil-
lion yuan in funding from partners to 91 social enterprises. (59)
Thirdly, the flourishing of SEs depends heavily on the development of the
social investment sector, which provides the prominent funding pool for
SEs. In recent years, experimental instances of social (impact) investing have
emerged in China, providing a new source of investment to fuel the devel-
opment of SEs. Private foundations (most of them corporate foundations
raising funds from individual enterprises or entrepreneurs) are becoming
the most important players in the field of impact investment in China. Sev-
eral corporate foundations are playing a leading role in supporting SEs in
China, such as the Narada Foundation, China Social Entrepreneur Founda-
tion, Leping Social Entrepreneur Foundation, and Live Foundation. (60) Mean-
while, international investment institutions are also employing the approach
of impact investment to provide funds to SEs in China. For instance, LGT
Venture Philanthropy invests in three SEs in China: Driptech, which provides
low-cost, effective drip irrigation system for small plot farmers, Shangrila
Farms, which provides market access to farmers, and the Institute of Public
& Environmental Affairs, which discovers and eradicates the root causes of
massive pollution. (61) Moreover, several foreign foundations, such as the
Ford Foundation and SOW Asia, which is based in Hong Kong, also take an
active role in supporting SEs in China. Although most of these impact in-
vestment initiatives remain relatively small in scale, they suggest a prom-
ising trend for the future development of SEs in China.
To summarise, these new initiatives may help to improve the ecosystem
for SE in China, presenting grassroots civic groups engaging in SE practices
with new possibilities to diversify sources of income (a mix of self-earned
income, government funds, and charitable donations) in order to strengthen
their financial viability and to prevent the over-dependency on government
for legitimacy and resources. 
Conclusion
The last few years have witnessed the emergence of SE in China’s non-
profit sector, where the development of grassroots civic organisations has
long been constrained by financial and institutional hurdles stemming from
an authoritarian political-social regime. The new phenomenon raises the
question of whether SE will inject vitality into grassroots NGOs in China,
as previous studies have found that SEs have emerged as “stronger alterna-
tives” to conventional non-profits in many Western societies. The post-dis-
aster construction after the 5.12 Wenchuan Earthquake provides an
appropriate research context to inquire into this question, as a variety of
SEs have been initiated by grassroots civic organisations in quake-ravaged
areas to pursue greater impact in post-disaster reconstruction. 
Based on an in-depth study of a typical case of SE, the authors draw several
preliminary conclusions on the developmental dynamic of SE and its poten-
tial to overcome the development pains of China’s grassroots NGOs. First of
all, the way socially entrepreneurial non-profits have participated in post-
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disaster reconstruction apparently differs from the approach of conventional
non-profits, manifested in multiple innovations in terms of defining objec-
tives, organisational structure, operational model, resource base, partnership,
sustainability, governance, profit-distribution, and scaling up of social impact.
Secondly, still in its infancy, SE in China’s non-profit sector has not evolved
into an effective solution to the development hurdles confronting grassroots
NGOs. However, the past years have witnessed a new trend of strengthening
the ecosystem for SE in China. For instance, new laws and policies have been
promulgated to promote the development of SE, SE training programs have
been launched to enhance entrepreneurial spirit and business skills among
grassroots NGOs, and social (impact) investment practices have been initi-
ated to provide desirable financial capital for SE. Arguably, all these new ini-
tiatives may jointly create a more favourable institutional environment in
which more grassroots civil groups in China can take on SE as a promising
approach to overcoming the stubborn ailments that have hampered per-
formance in China’s social sector for decades.
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